Sps agreement pdf

In addition, lack of scientific expertise and data collection capacity make it difficult for many developing countries to meet the complex requirements for a risk assessment to justify their deviation from international standards.

The transparency and other disciplines of the SPS Agreement also require a well- developed regulatory infrastructure. Making the necessary investments in this area would often mean that developing countries must divert scarce resources from other development priorities.

Thus, the SPS Agreement, like other WTO agreements creating disciplines for behind-the-border regulatory regimes, necessitates the recognition of differences in capacity across different levels of development. In article 5. They are often not well prepared for the discussions at these meetings, having not participated in the process of preparation of standards in the technical committees, and they often lack the necessary national data to provide a meaningful input into the discussions.

Special and differential treatment of developing countries 7 the strength of its regulatory system, its infrastructure, human and financial resources, etcetera, will affect the impact of regulatory disciplines on that country. It is therefore necessary to find ways to ensure that agreements laying down regulatory disciplines, such as the SPS Agreement, are development-friendly. Both these areas need to be addressed in order to ensure that developing countries are in a position to reap the benefits of the SPS Agreement without bearing a disproportionate burden of costs.

At the same time, as was widely recognised by the negotiators of the SPS Agreement, any mechanisms to deal with developing country concerns should not jeopardise the right of a member to impose scientifically justified measures necessary to prevent unacceptable risks to human, plant or animal life or health. It would fuel consumer fears, leading to a decrease in demand for products originating in developing countries, and harm 27 Stevens argues that this is particularly necessary now that the improved dispute settlement system has eliminated much of the flexibility that characterised the GATT.

Robert M Hamwey n 11 above. Creating loopholes though which measures that are disguised forms of protectionism can slip would undermine the market access gains achieved by the SPS Agreement.

Thus, it is important to find ways of helping developing countries to overcome their constraints without weakening legitimate SPS measures or watering down the disciplines of the agreement. However, the SPS Agreement does recognise the financial and technical resource constraints that developing countries face.

This consideration finds its first reflection in the preamble to the SPS Agreement, which recognises that: … developing country Members may encounter special difficulties in complying with sanitary and phytosanitary measures of importing Members, and as a consequence in access to markets, and also in the formulation and application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in their own territories, and desir[es] to assist them in their endeavors in this regard; Specific provisions exist in the SPS Agreement to take into account the special constraints of developing countries by providing them with some flexibility and assistance with regard to both their compliance with the SPS measures of other members, and their implementation of the obligations of the SPS Agreement.

However, article 14 and paragraphs 2, 8 and 9 of Annex B also reflect consideration of developing country constrains and can thus be regarded as forms of SDT.

For example, article 5. However, as these flexibilities are available to all members, they cannot be regarded as a form of SDT and will consequently not be discussed in this article. Special and differential treatment of developing countries 9 For this reason, while the focus of the following discussion will be on article 10, other relevant articles will be examined where relevant.

SDT with regard to SPS measures of other members Many developing countries rely on food and agricultural products for a large part of their export earnings. They therefore have a significant interest in access to the markets of their trading partners for these products. The prevalence of strict SPS measures in developed countries form barriers to market access.

The disciplines of the SPS Agreement aim to ensure that SPS measures are not misused as disguised forms of protection of domestic markets. Therefore, SPS measures that are not scientifically justified would fall foul of its rules. However, the SPS Agreement recognises the sovereign right of members to choose their own level of protection against scientifically proven SPS risks.

In developed countries, consumer demands and technological capacity often result in the choice of very high levels of protection, reflected in strict SPS requirements.

Thus, many legitimate SPS measures exist that comply with the requirements of the agreement, yet present considerable hurdles to market access for developing countries. This SDT should ensure appropriate regard for developing country constraints, without endangering the level of SPS protection chosen by the importing member. Consideration in the preparation and application of SPS measures Many of the problems faced by developing countries with regard to meeting the SPS requirements of their trading partners could be avoided, if regard were had to their constraints during the process of drafting the measures or in their application.

For example, some developed countries apply onerous and complex testing requirements to verify compliance with their SPS requirements, which developing countries lack the technology to meet. Similarly, process-based SPS requirements,33 while routine for more 33 Process-based requirements are those that address the process of production of a product, whereas product-based requirements focus on the characteristics of the final product.

HACCP is a method used to ensure food safety by analysing potential hazards in the production process, identifying the points where they can be controlled and setting up process parameters and their critical limits to achieve this control, as well as establishing follow- up procedures. Many developed countries currently apply HACCP requirements in a growing number of areas such as fishery products. Active consideration of developing country circumstances could lead to the framing of SPS measures and the application thereof in ways that facilitate compliance by developing countries, without endangering the level of SPS protection sought.

For this reason, article This is the only SDT provision in article 10 of the SPS Agreement that is couched in mandatory terms, and thus creates an obligation for members. Developing countries have expressed the concern that their constraints are, in practice, rarely taken into account in the preparation and application of SPS measures.

In response, Canada proposed that SDT be notified ex post, as an addendum to the notified measure. It has since been revised twice, and an addendum thereto developed for notification of the recognition of equivalence. Decision by the Committee. Special and differential treatment of developing countries 11 been requested in the context of a notified SPS measure, and what response has been given to such a request.

Although article Id at par In the meantime, WTO case law on other mandatory SDT provisions can be usefully examined to establish the likelihood that a challenge of non- compliance with article The panel noted that both parties in that dispute, the EC and India, had agreed that the first sentence of article 15 imposes no legal obligations on developed country members.

Thus, the panel expressed no views on this matter. Written Rebuttal of the Republic of Argentina 19 July pars Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before applying anti- dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing country Members.

In our view, the first sentence of Article 15 imposes no specific or general obligation on Members to undertake any particular action. In addition, SDT provisions must contain specific obligations to undertake particular action before a claim of violation can succeed. It does, however, impose an obligation to actively consider, with an open mind, the possibility of such a remedy prior to imposition of an anti-dumping measure that would affect the essential interests of a developing country.

This issue was not appealed. It is interesting that India in this case no longer held the view, stated in EC-Bed Linen, that the first sentence of article 15 contains no legal obligation. Id at par 7. This Panel Report was not appealed. It claimed that the EC did not have regard to the special situation of Brazil as a developing member the specificity of the Brazilian tax rebate system which is unlike the sophisticated VAT systems in developed countries and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency and conducted itself in the same way as it would have done when dealing with a developed member.

What the needs of particular developing countries are varies from case to case. Developing countries are not a homogenous group. To require that an SDT provision, to be effective and enforceable, must specify the required action to be taken in response to developing country needs undermines the very flexibility that characterises SDT. Article The risk exists that this provision may turn out to be, for practical purposes, a dead letter. Militating against this result is the principle of effective treaty interpretation, which requires that effect be given to all provisions of a treaty.

An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility. In , Sri Lanka requested that the EC suspend its ban on Sri Lankan cinnamon containing sulphur dioxide, and establish instead a maximum residue level of parts per million, pending the development of an international standard. As noted in n 15 above, article 3. Special and differential treatment of developing countries 15 This principle has been consistently followed in subsequent cases.

It is therefore likely that a panel interpreting article It is now necessary to examine the remaining SDT provisions in the SPS Agreement to determine if they can be regarded as giving effect to the obligation contained in article Longer compliance periods Compliance with new SPS measures often entails considerable changes to production and processing systems in developing countries.

Particularly where the existing domestic SPS regime is very different from the new requirements on foreign markets, and supporting public services and infrastructure are weak, compliance may require substantial efforts and investments. Thus, time is needed to find the necessary resources and to make the required changes. If exports from developing countries are immediately subject to the new SPS measures, they risk being excluded from their export markets while producers are adapting to the new measure.

This would result not only in loss of export revenue, but also in loss of market share, which may have significant long-term effects.

To address this problem, article This is aimed at allowing developing countries to maintain their export opportunities while adjusting to the new measures, in cases where this would not undermine the SPS protection sought by the importing member.

However, it would appear at first sight from the hortatory wording of this provision, that it encourages, rather than obliges, members to grant developing countries extended compliance periods. Therefore, once again, guidance may be sought from the interpretation of similarly worded SDT provisions in other WTO agreements.

Special and differential treatment of developing countries 17 arbitrator in another case65 had found guidance in this provision in his interpretation of article However, nothing in that provision obliges any Member actually to effectuate that general policy, or to do so in any particular way in any particular case. The Appellate Body noted the fact that article Further, members would be free to prevent a panel from carrying out its duties and thereby undermine the negotiated dispute settlement procedures.

Emphasis added. We are bound to reject an interpretation that promises such consequences. However, this seems limited to cases where the context of the provision indicates that an obligation was intended, without which negotiated rights would be made illusory. Its context includes article While the lack of operational language delineating the precise extent or nature of the obligation in article Otherwise, the right of developing country members to rely on this negotiated obligation would be illusory.

Unlike article It concretely calls on members to allow longer time frames for compliance with new SPS measures on products of interest to developing country members, where the level of SPS protection allows. The time frame has further been specified as usually six months in the Implementation Decision.

Thus, article However, in light of the fact that non-mandatory language is not seen by the Appellate Body as an impediment to the creation of obligations in cases where the context so demands, it would seem that such an interpretation is a logical extension of this line of reasoning. Special and differential treatment of developing countries 19 periods, of usually six months, to developing countries so as to maintain their export opportunities, in all cases where such phased introduction of new SPS measures would not threaten the level of protection sought by the importing member.

Reasonable adaptation periods Another provision in the SPS Agreement that aims to allow sufficient time for producers to adapt to new SPS measures can be found in paragraph 2 of Annex B. It differs from article As the reasonable adaptation period required by Annex B, paragraph 2, must be granted equally to both developed and developing country exporting members, this provision is not an SDT provision in the strict sense of the term.

However, this provision does hold particular advantages for developing countries. As developing countries often face more difficulties in adapting to new SPS measures than do their developed counterparts, the provision makes specific reference to developing countries. This implies that in determining the reasonable adaptation period to be provided for compliance with new SPS measures, a member should have particular regard to the time needed by the affected developing country members to adapt to the new requirements.

For this reason, it can be seen as an SDT provision in the broader sense of the term. Further, the specific reference in this provision to developing countries would make article This would add further support to its enforceable nature, as a provision giving effect to the general policy contained in article See id at This led developing countries to raise this as an implementation issue to be addressed before launching the Doha Round of negotiations.

Following discussions in this regard, the reasonable adaptation period, for purposes of Annex B, paragraph 2, was specified in the Doha Implementation Decision to mean normally a period of not less than six months. However, in each specific case, regard must be had to the circumstances of the measure and actions necessary for its implementation. The Implementation Decision further notes that the entry into force of trade liberalising measures should not be unnecessarily delayed.

This situation showed only slight improvement in There is no further clarification of what types of situation would be deemed urgent. Emergency notifications relate to measures adopted in situations of urgency, for which a reasonable adaptation period is not required.

This issue came before a panel in Canada-Patent Term where the US requested expedited consideration of the dispute under article 4. There is a risk that a panel will readily find that urgency exists in most cases where SPS measures comply with the remaining requirements of the SPS Agreement, since such measures address scientifically proven risks to human, plant or animal life or health.

A panel may be hesitant to interfere with the determination by a member in such a sensitive policy area. Instead, it is recommended that panels shoulder their responsibility to interpret and apply this provision, in order to guard the negotiated balance reflected in the SPS Agreement between the right of members to protect health in their territories, and the goal of increasing market access for food and agricultural products, including through SDT of developing countries.

While this task is not an easy one, it is nevertheless one which panels are obliged to carry out under article 11 of the DSU. In addition, urgency in article 4.

Panels are therefore likely to give a broader interpretation to urgency in the latter than in the former case. Nether the panel nor the Appellate Body is authorised to change this balance.

As the SPS Agreement is silent on this issue, the Appellate Body held that article 11 of the DSU articulates the appropriate standard of review applicable both to the determination of the facts and to their legal characterisation.

Facilitation of participation in international standard setting Another area where there is a need to take account of the special needs of developing countries, is in international standard setting.

The issue of developing country participation in international standard setting is currently at the forefront of policy discussions and reforms in the standard-setting bodies. Participation in the numerous committees of the international bodies where harmonised standards are initiated, developed and proposed for adoption is onerous. It requires not only financial and human resources for attendance of meetings, but also scientific data and technical capabilities for the formulation of national positions regarding standards of interest to the country.

An actively involved private sector is also crucial to provide important inputs for the identification of areas where standards are needed, and the formulation of standards that are feasible and appropriate for national conditions. However, this is often lacking in developing countries. These factors have led to assertions that the standards set by the international bodies do not cover areas of interest for developing countries and do not reflect a level of protection that is realistic or desirable for developing countries.

Deficient developing country participation in international standard setting has, since the coming into force of the SPS Agreement, significant implications for developing country trade. Even at the time of drafting the SPS Agreement, the importance of improving developing country participation in international standard setting was recognised. This concern is reflected in article Between total deference and de novo review is a wide spectrum of possibilities, and the lack of guidance for panels in this respect gives cause for concern in a field such as that of SPS regulation, where disputes turn on the evaluation of complex scientific facts.

Despite the fact that the SPS Agreement makes use of the standards set by the relevant international standard-setting bodies, these bodies are not under the authority of the WTO but are independent institutions. Any WTO provisions relating to improving developing country participation in the standard-setting process in these international bodies must therefore be addressed to WTO members.

These members may give effect to article Like article The same argument developed above would apply here, to support the interpretation of article International SPS standards can be seen as part of the process of development of SPS measures, as they are required to form the basis of SPS measures adopted by members, unless deviation can be scientifically justified.

Consequently, article In fact, studies have shown that poor countries are still less likely than rich ones to participate in WTO disputes Bown, ; Busch and Reinhardt, , possibly because they lack legal resources and expertise or because, due to their small markets, they have limited ability to enforce panel rulings via trade sanctions and logically refrain from filing claims they cannot enforce.

But it seems to be causing a problem. Writing in , Hathaway pointed out that demonstration of equivalence was a new area where much work remained to be done Hathaway, This need for groundwork has been recognised at the level of the CAC, and guidelines have been prepared.

However, few examples of equivalency have yet been achieved. Assistance in the form of technical advice, expertise, financial assistance or procurement of equipment can be requested during SPS Committee meetings.

The WTO has set up technical assistance activities in the SPS area to contribute to strengthening the capacities of developing-country members in meeting regulations for market access of agro-food products WTO, Such assistance has boosted trade for certain developing countries Henson ad Jaffee, While it is clear that the SPS Agreement supports the provision of special and differential treatment, this obligation is not binding Prevost and Mathee, According to Henson et al.

Because of concerns of developing-country members regarding the special and differential treatment provision under the agreement, a number of tools have been developed to help members understand and implement of the agreement. Effective implementation of SPS measures in developing countries depends on the provision of adequate financial and technical assistance Athukorala and Jayasuriya, ; Disdier, Fontagne and Mimouni, According to the SPS Agreement, WTO members must facilitate the provision of technical assistance to other members, especially to developing-country members.

Grants or loans are provided to ensure that members are not prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, as per the SPS Agreement. The STDF defines four categories in which technical assistance is available, specifically, general, food safety, animal health and plant health. For instance, 93 technical assistance activities related to food safety have been carried out since ; examples are capacity building in China and Guyana and strengthening fishery health products in ACP countries WTO, The main problem related to special and differential treatment has to do with transparency regarding the measurement of the direction and the extent of assistance WTO, A review by Wiig and Kolstad pointed out that assistance was given in a haphazard manner and was often based on political considerations.

Thus, securing technical assistance is still a problem. The requirement for more transparency has proven to be the most successful aspect of the agreement Roberts, ; Roberts, Notifications have been increasing, especially after see figure 1. Indeed, advance notice of new or modified measures allows firms to change production methods to meet new import requirements, thereby minimising transaction cost disruptions that such changes can cause to trade flows Josling, Roberts and Orden, Number of notifications Cumulative number of notifications 0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Figure 1 Number of SPS notifications circulated from to However, statistics on notifications do not necessarily give an accurate indication of the extent to which new or changed SPS measures are being adopted by WTO members.

One hundred and forty-two members 93 percent had established an SPS enquiry point. As of the end of December , the share of notifications submitted by developed-country members had reached 53 percent, while submission by developing- country members was The majority of notifications are still from developed countries like the United States, though countries like Mexico are associated with increased regulatory activity due to regional agreements like the NAFTA.

Countries like the United States, China and Japan have in fact taken the opportunity under the SPS Agreement to bring about significant administrative and regulatory reform Livshiz, ; Biukovic, , which could explain this notification pattern. The transparency provision has already improved information exchange among members, including developing countries. The quality of and access to information on notifications remains problematic. In , the SPS Committee also adopted revised procedures for transparency which provide additional information on the comment period and encourage the notification of measures even if they conform to international standards.

Some developing countries nevertheless face difficulties in complying with their transparency obligations Henson et al. Now, products coming from disease-free areas that may not correspond to political boundaries are to be considered on the basis of their disease status. This is a big advantage to many developing countries which export, for example, meat or papaya produced in several regions.

Developing countries have a poor attendance rate Mehta and George, ; OECD, , which prevents them from effectively addressing their concerns to the committee.

Time has been devoted to the consideration of specific trade concerns raised by members at the SPS Committee meetings since , thus helping to avoid potential trade conflicts OECD, According to Jaffee and Henson , the number and nature of complaints and counter-notifications specific trade concerns made through the SPS Committee can be used as an indicator to depict the nature and breadth of the challenges to standards and regulations by developing countries. Two hundred and ninety specific trade concerns were raised between and Figure 2 shows the number of new concerns raised each year; 13 new concerns were raised in Overall, 28 percent of trade concerns related to food safety concerns, 26 percent related to plant health, and 6 percent concerned other issues such as certification requirements or translation.

Forty percent of concerns raised related to animal health and zoonoses WTO, Developing-country members are particularly active regarding this agenda item in the SPS Committee meetings, showing their preference for softer structures than the formal dispute settlement mechanism to resolve trade issues. Since , developing- country members have raised trade concerns figure 3 compared to raised by developed-country members and 3 raised by least—developed country members. The fact that developed countries outnumbered developing countries suggests that access to the same scientific information and technologies still leaves room for disagreement over food safety measures Josling, Roberts and Orden, This growing number of concerns provides only a very crude indicator Jaffee and Henson, of the impact of the SPS Agreement.

According to an analysis by Josling, Roberts and Orden , developed countries were most often the source as well as the target of specific trade concerns that identified food and feed regulations as unjustified trade impediments, indicating that some gaps remained in convergence around SPS regulatory principles and that developed countries failed to agree on an acceptable level of protection. Both developed and developing countries cited the measures of developed countries in the majority of trade concerns related to human health.

But the level of developing-country trade that has been affected cannot be quantified. Moreover, complaints from developing countries emanated mostly from a few developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Thailand.

Yet the SPS Committee remains an effective platform for resolution of trade conflicts, and one that seems to be more accessible than the dispute settlement mechanism. This creates the possibility for conflict among countries, as seen through the disputes that have arisen due to the SPS Agreement Gruszczynski, The divergent food safety, plant and animal health regulatory requirements SPS measures can be important trade determinants.

All these factors combined pose a major challenge for developing countries by acting as a deterrent to trade. SPS measures can especially be detrimental to exports from developing countries Henson et al.

As a result, such countries can only exercise their rights and meet their obligations as members of the WTO to a limited extent Wilson, Mutusa and Nyamandi studied data on border inspection and detention of food exports from Africa and found that the most important difficulty faced by developing countries from Africa related to the lack of financial resources for implementation of the control requirements of developed countries.

Henson et al. A number of quantitative studies have also been carried out to estimate the impact of standards and food safety regulations on trade, as highlighted recently by Karov et al. In , it was estimated that the impact of SPS measures on U. The authors concluded that SPS measures were the most common factor that threatened, constrained or blocked the exports.

Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh estimated the financial implications of the strengthening of the EU regulation on aflatoxin levels in food on African exports of cereals, dried fruits and nuts to Europe. Another study by Wilson and Otsuki suggested that a tightening of pesticide regulations by 1 percent could lead to a 1. They also inferred that a lack of consensus on international standards and divergent national pesticide regulations were costly. More recently, using a gravity model, Gebrehiwet, Ngqangweni and Kirsten estimated the trade effect of total aflatoxin levels set by five OECD countries on South African food exports and concluded that stringent SPS measures are limiting trade markedly.

Using an econometric approach, Disdier et al. However, trade in some sectors could be improved with SPS measures. Indeed, the disciplines have reduced the opportunity for members to use trade-restrictive measures.

Compliance with the requirements of the SPS Agreement demands the infrastructure necessary for countries to establish the confidence of their trading partners in their agro-food exports. The SPS infrastructure is the institutional set-up required to comply with SPS requirements of trading partners and to demonstrate compliance Henson et al.

Following accession to the WTO, many countries revised their food control strategies and modernised their food legislation, for instance, countries in Eastern and Central Europe FAO, A new school of thought supports the theory of standards as catalyst, or the competitiveness view.

Certain developing countries can use, and are using, compliance with SPS measures to gain a competitive edge, for instance as demonstrated by Thai and Kenyan horticulture, Thai and Nicaraguan shrimp and Indian spices World Bank, ; Jaffee and Henson, ; Henson and Jaffee, Jaffee and Henson and Diaz Rios and Jaffee also argue that standards are not always barriers to trade.

They take issue with the Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh study, considering it to exaggerate the predicted effect of the new EU aflatoxin standard. But it was not expected to remove all barriers to agricultural and food products trade. Its potential to affect trade lies mainly in the areas where there are no agreed international standards and where there is limited scientific knowledge. There was a lack of infrastructure in developing countries, and the capacity to engage in international standards development activities was also limited.

They were also constrained by their relative inability to access information on standards or develop standards. The lack of tools to implement commitments and exercise rights, for example, equivalence, the insufficient time to comment on notifications Zarrilli, ; WTO, and the lack of international consensus standards for food safety were additional problems.

In the early years of the implementation of the SPS Agreement, it was recognised that the benefits reaped from it would be dependent on the country in which it was being applied Whitehead, However, in many cases, if not in most, developing countries find it difficult to meet the target levels established by importing countries.

Very often, they lack the food control infrastructure needed to meet the requirements of the SPS Agreement Zarrilli, ; Wilson, ; Nyangito, , to implement commitments such as transparency obligations and risk assessment, to exercise rights, and to fully engage in international standards development activities.

Finger and Schuler and Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki a have argued that the costs of implementing the SPS Agreement for developing countries are very high compared to their development budgets, and thus they do not participate in the implementation of the agreement as equal partners compared to developed countries. Indeed, considerable investment is required to improve food safety capacity in developing countries so as to comply with the SPS Agreement and regulatory requirements in export markets Henson, According to Thornsbury , the implementation process of the SPS Agreement has slowly progressed, while the setbacks have been widely publicised.

Jinji is of the same opinion. Moreover, the fact that scientific, technical and financial resources are inadequate implies that activities such as the preparation of technical regulations, the effective functioning of national standardising bodies and bodies responsible for conformity assessment, and participation in international standard-setting organisations are constrained.

This is especially relevant for developing countries. Indeed, most developing countries find it difficult to meet the target levels established by importing countries, especially because of the implementation costs, considered to be very high compared to their development budgets Finger and Schuler, ; Murray, The agreement also constrains the ability of governments to promulgate measures in instances where scientific knowledge is still poor and fails to provide for imperfectly understood risks that are based on the precautionary principle.

Roberts and Boutrif opine that the risk assessment methodology and practice will be a major cause for concern and a major challenge to effective enforcement of the SPS Agreement.

In the implementation of clauses such as the minimisation of the protectionist and unjustified discriminatory use of standards and the enhancement of transparency and harmonisation, experience has been mixed, possibly because of the complexities in managing food safety and animal health and the specific shortcomings of the SPS Agreement Jaffee and Henson, There are cases of accelerated schedules for making long-standing measures consistent with the obligations under the SPS Agreement; for example, Japan ended a year-old ban on several tomato varieties grown in the United States based on the scientific evidence that they were not afflicted with tobacco mould disease Josling, Roberts and Orden, The SPS Agreement has also contributed to freer trade.

The obligation to base regulations on scientific risk assessment has reduced the freedom of governments to use arbitrary regulatory interventions and therefore promoted convergence among countries. This obligation has also led to the resolution of many trade issues through the WTO without resort to dispute settlement and regulatory review Josling, Roberts and Orden, ; OECD, Moreover, the Agreement has had a positive effect for developing countries in that it has forced developed countries to provide more technical assistance to develop their infrastructure, leading to the development of recipient countries in terms of GDP, employment creation, social and environmental improvement CTA, Some developing countries have been able to derive benefits from the implementation of the SPS Agreement.

For instance, Mauritius has availed itself of its rights under the Agreement both to prevent its trading partners from using unjust measures without scientific justification and to secure technical assistance Neeliah and Goburdhun, This review has highlighted the negative effects of the SPS Agreement on developing countries as they appear in the literature. It has, however, also pointed out a number of areas in which the Agreement has been useful in facilitating trade.

It is concluded that reviews of the Agreement, punctually conducted, should take greater account of the needs of developing countries so that they can successfully export agro- food products to developed countries. Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation.

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