Israel is also suspected of having assassinated a key Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, in November But those efforts have failed to prevent Iran from making significant strides in its nuclear program. Iran wants to see the sanctions lifted first and to receive ironclad assurances that a future U.
With JCPOA restrictions in place, the United States estimated in that it would take Iran 12 months to produce enough nuclear fuel for a bomb should it decide to abandon the deal and seek a workable weapon. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran was permitted to stockpile up kilograms of low-enriched uranium and operate just over 5, 1st-generation centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Tehran is prohibited from enriching uranium with greater than a 3. Since the U.
In July , Iran began enriching up to 5 percent; to 20 percent in January ; and to 60 percent in April From there it is a relatively short step to producing weapons-grade nuclear fuel. Producing weapons-grade fuel requires extracting the fissile material that can trigger a nuclear reaction uranium from mined uranium.
Refining uranium to 3. In order to accelerate the pace of enrichment, Iran has installed thousands more advanced centrifuges capable of enriching uranium at a higher quality at both Natanz and its Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. As of November , Iran had built up a stockpile of some 2, David Albright, the founder of the Institute for Science and International Security, said that Iran has already acquired enough 20 and 60 percent uranium to produce at least 45 kilograms of highly enriched uranium at 90 percent—enough weapons-grade fuel to produce a nuclear bomb in short order.
In several months, he added, it could produce enough fuel for two more bombs. In six months, he estimates, Iran may be in a position to test a nuclear explosive.
Albright said that is cause for alarm because the production of nuclear-weapons-grade fuel is among the most difficult technical achievements on the road to the bomb. Some nonproliferation experts say that may be so, but nuclear fuel alone does not make a nuclear weapons arsenal. There remains considerable mystery over the amount of time it would take Iran to develop a working nuclear warhead.
The Israeli government estimates that Iran would require about one to two years to be able to produce a nuclear weapon. But some experts say that is no reason to be complacent. Iran has done considerable design work on a nuclear weapon.
In the s, an arms-trafficking network led by A. A U. In February , for instance, Iran produced a small amount of natural uranium metal at its nuclear facility in Isfahan, according to a confidential IAEA report obtained by the Wall Street Journal.
Ballistic missiles play a critical role in any nuclear weapons program, and Iran has had years of experience developing them. Iran also has several souped-up versions, including the Emad, the Sejjil, and the Ghadr The Ghadr has a range of around 1, miles, placing it within striking distance of Tel Aviv, Israel. You still have to figure out how to fit a nuclear weapon onto the missiles and make sure the extremely sensitive nuke will survive long enough to make it to the target and detonate.
It remains unclear how far Iran has progressed in weaponizing its missiles. With talks underway, Iran has sought to flex its missile prowess, putting three ballistic missiles—the Dezful, Qiam, and Zolfaghar—on display in central Tehran Friday. The three missiles, which have a range of over miles—were purportedly used in strikes on U. Colum Lynch is a senior staff writer at Foreign Policy. Twitter: columlynch. Commenting on this and other recent articles is just one benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription.
Already a subscriber? Log In. Subscribe Subscribe. View Comments. Join the conversation on this and other recent Foreign Policy articles when you subscribe now. Not your account? Log out. Comments are closed automatically seven days after articles are published. To establish requirements and responsibilities for planned nuclear explosive operations NEOs. The two-person concept is implemented to ensure no lone individual has unrestricted access to a nuclear explosive.
Site offices may also require two-person concept protection for other operations. Each person on a two-person concept team must be certified in the Human Reliability Program; have authorized access to the nuclear explosive area NEA ; have technical knowledge of the task being performed; be knowledgeable of pertinent safety and security requirements; be in a position to detect incorrect or unauthorized acts and take appropriate action; the two-person concept may be implemented using either zone coverage or person-to-person coverage.
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